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Abstract—Lyra2REv2 is a hashing algorithm that consists of
a chain of individual hashing algorithms, and it is used as a
proof-of-work function in several cryptocurrencies. The most
crucial and exotic hashing algorithm in the Lyra2REv2 chain is
a specific instance of the general Lyra2 algorithm. In this work,
we present the first hardware implementation of the specific
instance of Lyra2 that is used in Lyra2REv2 and we explain how
several properties of this algorithm can be exploited in order
to optimize the design. Moreover, we present an FPGA-based
hardware implementation of a full miner chain for Lyra2REv2
on a Xilinx Multi-Processor System on Chip. Our proposed
Lyra2REv2 miner chain is shown to be significantly more energy
efficient than both a GPU and a commercially available FPGA-
based miner. Finally, we also explain how our simplified Lyra2
and Lyra2REv2 architectures can be modified with minimal effort
to also support the recent Lyra2REv3 chained hashing algorithm.
Index Terms—Lyra2, Lyra2REv2, Lyra2REv3, hardware
miner, FPGA miner, MPSoC miner, cryptocurrency
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, there has been a surge in the popularity ofcryptocurrencies, which are digital currencies that enable
transactions through a decentralized consensus mechanism.
Most cryptocurrencies are based on a blockchain, which is an
ever-growing list of transactions that are grouped in blocks.
Individual blocks in the chain are linked together using a
cryptographic hash of the previous block, which ensures resis-
tance against modifications, and every transaction is digitally
signed, typically by using public-key cryptography. Various
mechanisms are used in order to deter denial-of-service attacks
and, in particular, double-spending attacks where the same
digital coin is used in multiple concurrent transactions. Many
popular cryptocurrencies, incuding Bitcoin [2], use a proof-of-
work (PoW) mechanism, which was first proposed in [3] to
combat the problem of junk mail. The proof-of-stake (PoS) and
proof-of-burn (PoB) mechanisms are other notable proposals.
The PoW system requires that new blocks provide proof
that a function that requires a significant amount of a limited
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resource was used to construct them before they get accepted
into the chain. For example, the employed function can be
limited by the available processing power, the available mem-
ory, or the network bandwidth and latency. Cryptocurrencies
typically use functions that are limited by the available pro-
cessing power, the most common approach being that random
numbers are appended to a block until its cryptographic hash
meets a certain condition (e.g., some of its most-significant
bits are equal to 0). The chain with the most cumulative PoW
is accepted as the correct one, so that an attacker must control
more than half of the active processing power on the network
to perform a double-spend attack. This is unlikely to happen
in practice if the processing power is large enough and is
owned by non-colluding entities. Processing nodes that help
to compute the hashes of new blocks are called miners, and
are rewarded with a fraction of the cryptocurrency when a new
block is accepted into the blockchain.
The first cryptocurrency, i.e., Bitcoin [2], was initially mined
using desktop CPUs. Then, GPUs were used to significantly
increase the hashing speed. Eventually, GPU mining was out-
paced by FPGA miners, which were in turn surpassed by ASIC
miners. Nowadays, the majority of the computing power on the
Bitcoin network is found in large ASIC farms, each operated
by a single entity, which makes the decentralized nature of
Bitcoin debatable. To solve this issue, new PoW algorithms
have been proposed that aim to be ASIC-resistant. ASIC
resistance is achieved by using hashing algorithms that are
highly serial, memory-intensive, and parameterizable so that a
manufactured ASIC can easily be made obsolete by changing
some of the parameters. Since the cost of manufacturing
new ASICs whenever some parameters change is prohibitive,
GPU mining of ASIC-resistant cryptocurrencies is generally
much more low-risk and cost-effective. A prime example of
an ASIC-resistant hashing algorithm is Lyra2REv2 (and its
recently introduced Lyra2REv3 modification), which is used
by MonaCoin [4], Verge [5], Vertcoin [6], and some smaller
cryptocurrencies. The chained structures of Lyra2REv2 and
Lyra2REv3 are shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, respectively.
The BLAKE [7], Keccak [8], Skein [9], Blue Midnight Wish
(BMW) [10], and CubeHash [11] hashing algorithms are well-
known and have been studied heavily, both from theoretical
and hardware-implementation perspectives (e.g., [12]–[15]),
as they were all candidates in the SHA-3 competition. On
the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, apart from
our own previous work [1], no hardware implementation of
the simplified Lyra2 and Lyra2MOD versions of Lyra2 [16],
[17] as used in the Lyra2REv2 and Lyra2REv3 algorithms,
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Fig. 1. The Lyra2REv2 chained hashing algorithm.
respectively, have been reported in the literature.
One potential issue with ASIC-resistant cryptocurrencies
is that GPUs are generally much less energy efficient than
ASICs, meaning that a massive adoption of ASIC-resistant
cryptocurrencies would significantly increase the (already very
high) energy consumption of cryptocurrency mining. FPGA-
based miners, on the other hand, are flexible, energy efficient,
and readily available to the general public at reasonable prices.
Thus, provided that public and user-friendly FPGA-based
miners become available, we believe that FPGAs are in fact
an attractive platform for ASIC-resistant cryptocurrencies that
should not be shunned by the community.
Contributions: In this work, we present the first FPGA
implementation of the simplified Lyra2 hashing algorithm as
used in Lyra2REv2. Moreover, we describe an FPGA-based
hardware implementation of a complete Lyra2REv2 hashing
chain on a Xilinx Multi-Processor System on Chip (MPSoC).
While we do not provide explicit implementation results
for Lyra2MOD or for a Lyra2REv3 chain, currently only
used by the (somewhat less popular) Vertcoin cryptocurrency,
we explain in detail how our architecture can be modified
correspondingly. We present post-layout results for a Xilinx
MPSoC for the complete Lyra2REv2 mining chain as well
as for the individual hashing cores. These results show that
our proposed Lyra2REv2 hardware architecture can achieve
a hashing throughput of 11.76 MHash/s with an energy-
efficiency approximately 2 to 4 times better than existing
solutions at 804 nJ/Hash, while requiring less than 70% of
the programmable logic (PL) resources of the MPSoC.
Outline: The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section II, we provide the necessary background for
the PoW concept and for the Lyra2 algorithm. In Section III,
we give an in-depth explanation of the simplifications that
Lyra2REv2 and Lyra2REv3 make to the generic Lyra2 algo-
rithm. The hardware implementation of the simplified Lyra2
and Lyra2MOD algorithms is described at length in Section IV.
In Section V, we describe an MPSoC-based hardware archi-
tecture that implements the full Lyra2REv2 hashing chain
and can be easily modified to also implement the Lyra2REv3
hashing chain. We provide implementation and comparison
results for the full Lyra2REv2 hashing chain in Section VI.
Section VI also includes results for the individual hashing
cores, notably including our simplified Lyra2 core. Finally,
Section VII concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the necessary background on the
PoW concept, as well as some components of the Keccak and
BLAKE2 hashing algorithms which are used in Lyra2.
BLAKE-256 Lyra2MOD
CubeHash-256
Lyra2MODBMW-256
Fig. 2. The Lyra2REv3 chained hashing algorithm.
TABLE I
CONTENTS OF THE BITCOIN BLOCK HEADER
Bytes Name
4 version
32 previous block header hash
32 merkle root hash
4 time
4 nBits
4 nonce
A. Proof of Work
In order to explain the PoW concept in more detail, we
use Bitcoin as an example [18], but we note that many
other Bitcoin-derived cryptocurrencies, such as MonaCoin and
Vertcoin, use the same header structure. Each block in the
Bitcoin blockchain has an 80-byte (or 640-bit) header that
contains information about the block, as shown in Table I.
The version field dictates which version of the block val-
idation rules needs to be followed. The previous block
header hash and merkle root hash contain hashes
of the headers of previous blocks to ensure that no previous
transaction in the blockchain can be modified without also
modifying the header of the current block. The time field
contains the Unix epoch time at which each miner started
performing the PoW, which must be strictly greater than the
median time of the previous 11 blocks. The nBits and
nonce fields are the most relevant to the PoW. Specifically,
nBits defines a 256-bit numerical value using an encoding
explained in detail in [18], while nonce can be chosen freely
by the miner. The PoW that each miner performs amounts to
finding a value for nonce so that a (chained) hash function of
the header has a numerical value that is strictly smaller than
the target threshold, i.e., the value defined by nBits. Since
hash functions are generally not invertible, this can only be
achieved by testing a very large number of nonce values
until the target threshold is satisfied.
B. The Keccak Duplex
Keccak is a family of hashing algorithms based on a
cryptographic sponge [19], [20]. A cryptographic sponge is
a function that takes an arbitrary-length input to produce an
arbitrary-length hashed output. Lyra2 uses a specific imple-
mentation of the sponge, called the duplex construction, which
has a state that is preserved across different inputs. The duplex
construction with naming conventions as adopted in Lyra2 can
be found in [21, Fig. 2]. It consists of a permutation function
f that operates on a w-bit state vector, where w = b+ c and
the parameters b and c are called the bitrate and the capacity
3Algorithm 1 The G-function of BLAKE2b as used in Lyra2
1: INPUTS: a, b, c, d
2: OUTPUTS: a′, b′, c′, d′
3: a′ ← a+ b
4: d′ ← (d⊕ a′)≫ 32
5: c′ ← c+ d′
6: b′ ← (b⊕ c′)≫ 24
7: a′ ← a′ + b′
8: d′ ← (d′ ⊕ a′)≫ 16
9: c′ ← c′ + d′
10: b′ ← (b′ ⊕ c′)≫ 63
of the sponge, respectively, as well as a padding rule pad.
We note that the permutation f is iterative and performs a
pre-defined number of iterations, also called rounds.
A call to the duplex construction proceeds as follows. An
input string M is first fed into the duplex. Then, it is padded
to length b and XOR’d into the lower b bits of the state. The
state is then fed through the permutation f . The output of f is
the new state of the duplex, while its lower l bits are the output
hash, where l ≤ b. If we consider the duplex construction as
an object H , then the aforementioned procedure is referred to
as a method H.duplex(M, l). The following two auxiliary
methods are useful to simplify the notation: H.absorb(M)
updates the state using the input M but discards the out-
put (equivalent to H.duplex(M, 0)), while H.squeeze(l)
reads l output bits and then calls H.absorb(∅), where ∅
denotes an empty input string.
C. The BLAKE2b Round Function
BLAKE2 [22] is a family of hash functions designed for
fast software implementations. It is the successor of BLAKE as
submitted to the SHA-3 competition [23]. The Lyra2 algorithm
heavily draws from the round function of BLAKE2b, the 64-
bit variant of BLAKE2. The round function consists of an
arrangement of blocks that apply a so-called G-function to a
16-word state, where one G-function operates on 4 different
state words. For BLAKE2b a word has 64 bits meaning that
16 state words amount to 1024 bits. The total round transforms
these 1024 bits using four G-blocks, rearranges the output, and
then does a four G-block transformation again. Algorithm 1
describes the modified BLAKE2b G-function as used in Lyra2,
where x≫ y denotes a y-bit right rotation of x.
III. THE SIMPLIFIED LYRA2 ALGORITHMS USED IN
LYRA2REV2 AND LYRA2REV3
Lyra2 was initially created as a password hashing scheme
(PHS) for secure storage [16], [17]. Lyra2 uses the duplex
construction from Keccak, where the permutation function f
is the round function from BLAKE2b. The reasoning for this
choice is twofold and stems from the concept of favoring
CPUs. On one hand, the G-function of BLAKE2b is software-
oriented (e.g., the rotations are chosen to specifically benefit
from SIMD instructions). On the other hand, the permutation
of BLAKE2b has been shown to be secure even with a reduced
number of rounds [24], whereas a full permutation normally
consists of 12 rounds. As explained in more detail in the se-
quel, after every permutation, the Lyra2 algorithm performs a
Algorithm 2 Lyra2 algorithm as specified in Lyra2REv2.
1: PARAMS:H, ρ, ω, T,R,C, k, b as H.b
2: INPUT: pwd
3: OUTPUT:K
. Bootstrapping Phase
4: params← len(K) || len(pwd) || len(pwd) || T ||R || C
5: H.absorb(pad(pwd || pwd || params))
. Setup Phase
6: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
7: M [0][C − 1− col]← Hρ.squeeze(b)
8: end for
9: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
10: M [1][C−1−col]←M [0][col]⊕Hρ.duplex(M [0][col], b)
11: end for
12: for row0 ← 2 to R− 1 do
13: prev0 ← row0 − 1
14: row1 ← row0 − 2
15: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
16: rand← Hρ.duplex(M [row1][col]M [prev0][col], b)
17: M [row0][C − 1− col]←M [prev0][col]⊕ rand
18: M [row1][col]←M [row1][col]⊕ (rand≪ ω)
19: end for
20: end for
. Wandering Phase
21: for row0 ← 0 to R · T − 1 do
22: prev0 ← row0 − 1
23: row1 ← lsw(rand) mod R
24: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
25: rand← Hρ.duplex(M [row1][col]M [prev0][col], b)
26: M [row0][col]←M [row0][col]⊕ rand
27: M [row1][col]←M [row1][col]⊕ (rand≪ ω)
28: end for
29: end for
. Wrap-up Phase
30: H.absorb(M [row1][0])
31: K ← H.squeeze(k)
memory access. A reduced number of rounds in a permutation
allows more memory accesses for the same execution time,
making low-memory attacks on parallel platforms more costly.
In the remainder of the text, calls to a full-round (i.e., 12
iterations) duplex are denoted as calls to H , while reduced-
round duplexing as calls to Hρ, where ρ denotes the reduced
number of rounds. Because the G-functions are specified to
operate on an array of 16 64-bit words, Lyra2 uses a duplex
with a width of w = 16 · 64 = 1024 bits. Pseudocode for
the simplified version of Lyra2 that is used specifically in
Lyra2REv2 is given in Algorithm 2 and can be compared to
the original Lyra2 pseudocode available in [16, Algorithm 2].
In the following sections, we first explain each phase of
the simplified Lyra2 algorithm used in Lyra2REv2 and how
it differs from the reference implementation of Lyra2 in
detail. Then, we explain the differences between Lyra2 used
Lyra2REv2 and Lyra2MOD used in the updated Lyra2REv3
algorithm.
A. Bootstrapping Phase
In the bootstrapping phase, the duplex is initialized with
a state that depends on the input pwd, a salt (which in
Lyra2REv2 is set to be equal to pwd for simplicity), and the
parameters T , R, and C by using a full-round absorb. The
duplex H in Algorithm 2 internally uses a bitrate b = 768 bits
and a capacity c = 256 bits. The H.absorb(·) call on line 5,
4however, considers only inputs of 512 bits instead of b bits, so
as to not overwrite the upper part of the initialization state, i.e,
the 512-bit initialization value IV specified by BLAKE2b. This
results in two full-round absorbs, where the first and second
absorbs process (pwd ||pwd) and pad(params), respectively.
B. Setup Phase
During the setup phase of Lyra2, an R × C × b memory
matrix M is initialized using the single-round duplex H1. In
the simplified version of Lyra2 used in Lyra2REv2, we have
R = C = 4. Rows are initialized from first to last, while
columns within each row are initialized from last to first. From
the second row onward, a previous row is re-read, making it
impractical to only store parts of the memory matrix. Also,
from the third row onward, in addition to the previous row,
i.e., prev0, a specific pre-initialized row, i.e., row1, is revisited
(i.e., read and updated) in a deterministic manner. Rows are
re-read or revisited from the first to the last column. Revisited
rows use a rotated version of the duplex output, where the
rotation number is chosen as ω = 64 in Lyra2REv2. We note
that the general revisiting scheme for row1 is significantly
more complicated when R > 4, as rows to be revisited can be
chosen from within a specific window.
C. Wandering Phase
The wandering phase is configurable to be the most time-
consuming of the four phases. This is done through a timecost
parameter T , that sets a number of rows 2R · T to be
revisited. In Lyra2REv2, there is only a single iteration over
the memory matrix, as T = 1. Specifically, it revisits two
rows row0 and row1, where row0 is chosen deterministically
but row1 is chosen in a pseudorandom fashion by using the
least significant part of the duplex output. We note that the
pseudorandom and deterministic row can collide, resulting in
the operations on lines 26 and 27 to sequentially read from and
then write to the same matrix cell. We also note that the refer-
ence implementation of Lyra2 selects not only row1, but also
row0 pseudorandomly. Furthermore, whereas the simplified
Lyra2 in Lyra2REv2 uses a deterministic column counter col,
the reference implementation features pseudorandom counters
col0 and col1. Lastly, similar to prev0 as the previous row0,
prev1 is introduced to track the previous row1. These extra
variables appear, for example, on line 25, where the simplified
Lyra2 has a two-operand wordwise addition, but the reference
implementation would pass M [row0][col] M [row1][col] 
M [prev0][col0]M [prev1][col1] as input to the sponge.
D. Wrap-up Phase
The wrap-up phase consists of a full-round absorb of a
specific cell of M followed by a squeeze of the hashed output
K. This specific cell is likewise pseudorandom, as it is selected
as the first cell of the lastly revisited pseudorandom row. The
requested squeeze length k = 256 is lower than the bitrate
b = 768, which means that the final output is provided directly
from the duplex state without a permutation f .
Algorithm 3 Lyra2MOD algorithm as specified in Lyra2REv3.
1: PARAMS:H, ρ, ω, T,R,C, k, b as H.b, c as H.c
2: INPUT: pwd
3: OUTPUT:K
. Bootstrapping Phase
4: instance← 0
5: params← len(K) || len(pwd) || len(pwd) || T ||R || C
6: H.absorb(pad(pwd || pwd || params))
. Setup Phase
7: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
8: M [0][C − 1− col]← Hρ.squeeze(b)
9: end for
10: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
11: M [1][C−1−col]←M [0][col]⊕Hρ.duplex(M [0][col], b)
12: end for
13: for row0 ← 2 to R− 1 do
14: prev0 ← row0 − 1
15: row1 ← row0 − 2
16: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
17: rand← Hρ.duplex(M [row1][col]M [prev0][col], b)
18: M [row0][C − 1− col]←M [prev0][col]⊕ rand
19: M [row1][col]←M [row1][col]⊕ (rand≪ ω)
20: end for
21: end for
. Wandering Phase
22: for row0 ← 0 to R · T − 1 do
23: prev0 ← row0 − 1
24: rand′ ← H0.squeeze’(b+ c)
25: instance← rand′[instance] mod 16
26: row1 ← rand′[instance] mod R
27: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
28: rand← Hρ.duplex(M [row1][col]M [prev0][col], b)
29: M [row0][col]←M [row0][col]⊕ rand
30: M [row1][col]←M [row1][col]⊕ (rand≪ ω)
31: end for
32: end for
. Wrap-up Phase
33: H.absorb(M [row1][0])
34: K ← H.squeeze(k)
E. From Lyra2REv2 to Lyra2REv3
Recently, the developers of Lyra2REv2 proposed
Lyra2REv3 with the goal to make ASIC miners for
Lyra2REv2, that became available on the market,
obsolete. Vertcoin is currently the only Lyra2REv2-based
cryptocurrency that has performed a hard fork to force the
miners to use Lyra2REv3 [25]. Fig. 2 illustrates the new
chained hashing algorithm. Compared to the Lyra2REv2
chain in Fig. 1, it can be seen that the Keccak-256 and
Skein-256 hashing algorithms were removed from the chain,
and a second instance of a Lyra2-based hashing algorithm
was added. The developers justified the removal of both
Keccak-256 and Skein-256 by mentioning the existence of
significantly more efficient hardware implementations of
these algorithms compared to their software counterparts.
In addition to these changes, the simplified Lyra2 algorithm
itself has been modified.
The updated Lyra2 algorithm as used in Lyra2REv3, called
Lyra2MOD, is illustrated in Algorithm 3, where the changes
from the simplified Lyra2 algorithm used in Lyra2REv2 are
highlighted in blue (lines 4, and 24–26). While the changes
appear to be minor, the Lyra2MOD modifications are non-
conventional in the Lyra2 scheme. Lyra2MOD introduces a
new variable called instance, that can take the value of the
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four least-significant bits of any word in the (b+c)-bit sponge
state. This assignment is non-conventional, because it does
not exclude the four words that make up the sponge capacity
c. Within its specifications, the sponge construction does not
allow for such an operation that directly reads bits from
the capacity part of the sponge [19]. The variable instance
is then used to update row1, which can now similarly be
assigned some least significant part of any state word. The
assignments to instance and row1 require defining a new
operation on the sponge H that requests the current state
without performing any rounds. We call this new operation
squeeze′ for its similarity with the squeeze operation, with
the difference that the former is not restricted to requests of
l ≤ b bits on the state. To omit the round functionality of the
sponge, we call squeeze′ on H0, i.e., the sponge reduced to
zero rounds. The intended effect of these changes is to further
serialize the algorithm, making hardware implementation more
challenging. We briefly discuss the impact of these changes on
resource requirements and on performance in Section IV-D.
IV. PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC IMPLEMENTATION OF
SIMPLIFIED LYRA2
In this section, we discuss how the Lyra2 algorithm, which
is the most complex algorithm of the Lyra2REv2 chain, can
be efficiently mapped to a hardware implementation. The
hardware implementation of the full Lyra2REv2 hashing chain
is discussed in Section V, as well as the changes that would
be required for a Lyra2REv3 chain. Similarly to the previous
section, we first describe an implementation of Lyra2 for
Lyra2REv2, and we then explain the necessary changes to
implement Lyra2MOD for Lyra2REv3.
Recall that, in the current instance of Lyra2 as used in
Lyra2REv2, the timecost parameter is T = 1, the number of
rows in the memory matrix is R = 4, the number of columns in
the memory matrix is C = 4, and the desired hashing output
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length is k = 256 (we note that the same parameter values
are also used for Lyra2MOD in Lyra2REv3). Our architecture
is optimized for these parameter values, but can be modified
relatively easily to accommodate potential changes in the
aforementioned parameters. Moreover, for R = C = 4 and
b = 768, the memory matrix M is 1.5 kB in size, which
is clearly not prohibitively large to be implemented either
in PL or on an ASIC. The claimed ASIC-resistance of the
Lyra2REv2 algorithm comes from the fact that T , C, and
R can be increased easily if necessary and that the chain of
hashing algorithms itself can be modified (as is the case with
the newer Lyra2REv3 algorithm).
The high-level datapath of our proposed PL implementation
of the simplified Lyra2 algorithm used in Lyra2REv2 is
shown in Fig. 3, where the duplex construction with its state,
round, and XOR input block can be clearly distinguished. The
memory matrix M is mapped to a block RAM (BRAM). To
reduce the complexity of the multiplexer (MUX) at the input
of the duplex, the BRAM also contains constant vectors of
b bits used during the bootstrapping and setup phases, i.e., an
all-zero vector and the pad(params) vector.
As mentioned in Sections II-C and III, the round function
f of the Lyra2 algorithm is an arrangement of BLAKE G-
functions. Fig. 4 shows the hardware architecture of BLAKE’s
G-function, where all signals are m bits wide. Lyra2 uses the
BLAKE2b variation, i.e., m = 64, R1 = 32, R2 = 24, R3 =
16, and R4 = 63 (cf. Algorithm 1). Furthermore, the CM2i and
CM2i+1 inputs are not used, thus the corresponding adders are
omitted in our implementation of the round function for Lyra2.
In the following, we first describe a version of the hardware
architecture of our simplified Lyra2, where each round of the
f function is executed in a single clock cycle (CC). We then
describe how this basic architecture can be improved through
pipelining.
A. Basic Iterative Architecture
Our basic iterative Lyra2 architecture requires 68 CCs per
hash: 24 for the bootstrapping phase, 16 for the setup and
wandering phases, and 12 for the wrap-up phase.
1) Bootstrapping Phase: During the bootstrapping phase,
the duplex processes two 512-bit input blocks from
pad(pwd || pwd || params) using a full-round absorb. In
Lyra2REv2, pwd = cubeout, with cubeout being the output of
the first CubeHash instance, i.e., the previous algorithm in the
chain. Thus, as shown in Fig. 3, the (pwd ||pwd) vector is one
6of the inputs to the MUX of the duplex. On the other hand, the
pad(params) vector is fed into the sponge by loading it on qa
while simultaneously loading the all-zero vector on qb. Both
constants are stored at known addresses in the BRAM, and are
absorbed in a separate 12-round Bootstrap state. During
bootstrapping, the duplex only receives an input vector in the
first round. Hence, for subsequent rounds, qa and qb output
the all-zero vector, and their sum is passed to the duplex via
its input MUX.
2) Setup Phase: We split the setup phase into three dis-
tinct phases for convenience, namely Setup0, Setup1, and
Setup2, which correspond to Lines 6–8, Lines 9–11, and
Lines 12–20 of Algorithm 2, respectively. Similarly to the
bootstrapping phase, the setup phase uses the all-zero vector
stored in the BRAM. In the Setup0 state, the squeezes input
an empty message into the duplex and directly write the duplex
output to the BRAM. To achieve that, the all-zero vector is
output on qa, qb, and qc. Setup1 reads the all-zero vector
on qb, but a specific vector from the BRAM on qa. Setup2
reads two vectors from qa and qb. Both the duplex output and
the rotated duplex output are XOR’d with two other vectors
from the BRAM, requiring the two XOR blocks in parallel as
illustrated in Fig. 3. On the control path, counters keep track of
the various rows (row0, row1, prev1) and their corresponding
columns to generate read and write addresses for the RAM.
3) Wandering Phase: The input to the duplex in the wan-
dering phase is always the word-wise addition of two RAM
cells. Both XOR blocks connected to the duplex output are
used. As mentioned in the algorithmic description of the
wandering phase in Section III-C, the pseudorandom and
deterministic rows used in this phase can collide. In hardware,
this special case requires the output of one XOR block to be
input to the other, while the write port of the first XOR block
needs to be disabled to prevent write collisions on the RAM.
4) Wrap-Up Phase: During the wrap-up phase, one RAM
cell is input into the sponge and then processed using a full-
round absorb. For the following squeeze, the requested hashed-
output length k is lower than the bitrate b, i.e., the duplex state
directly provides the output hash.
B. Memory Matrix
In the wandering phase, up to two RAM cells need to be
written and three RAM cells need to be read per CC. These
operations cannot be spread over multiple CCs without nega-
tively affecting the overall throughput of the design. Therefore,
we use standard true-dual-port BRAMs along with multipump-
ing and replication techniques [26] in order implement the
required functionality. Replication provides extra read ports by
physically replicating the BRAM while connecting the write
ports to keep the two copies coherent. Multipumping operates
the BRAM at double the clock frequency of the surrounding
logic, which, together with replication, effectively provides
four read ports and two write ports. A b = 768-bit wide
BRAM with true-dual-port functionality can be implemented
using 21 × 36K and one 18K PL BRAM primitives, which
are 21 × 36 and 18 bits wide, respectively. Considering that,
even with added FIFOs, our full chain is not limited by the
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(a) Simplified Lyra2 (b) Lyra2MOD
Fig. 5. Hardware implementation of the row selection during the wandering
phase for (a) the simplified Lyra2 and (b) Lyra2MOD. Clock signals are
omitted for clarity.
availability of BRAM, the cost of replication in terms of
hardware resources is reasonable. In total, our Lyra2 core then
uses 42× 36K + 2× 18K = 1548 Kbits of BRAM.
C. Pipelined Architecture
Pipelining the BLAKE2b round function can greatly reduce
the delay of the critical path. Recall that the round function
consists of an arrangement of G-functions, whose architecture
is illustrated in Fig. 4. In the basic iterative version described
above, the critical path of the round function extends from the
RAM read ports to the RAM write ports. Eight pipeline stages
in the round were found to optimally increase throughput/area.
Each hash that is concurrently being processed by the core
needs its own memory. However, extra RAM-based memory
is readily available since the current Lyra2REv2 parameters
result in a RAM depth much shallower than that of the PL
BRAMs. With adequate scheduling, concurrent hashes write to
the same BRAMs in distinct CCs. While read ports qa and qb
feed the duplex, qc and qd feed the XORs with duplex outputs.
When pipelining the round function, qc and qd therefore need
to be delayed by as many CCs as there are pipeline stages. The
extra read port that is unused in the basic architecture allows
delaying the control path for qd rather than using a delayed
version of qb, avoiding a long chain of 768-bit registers.
Eight pipeline stages in the round increase the latency to 544
CCs per hash. On the other hand, eight hashes are processed
concurrently. This results in one hash being output every 68
CCs, and the achievable clock frequency more than doubles
so the overall hashing throughput is improved significantly.
D. Programmable Logic Implementation of Lyra2MOD
A potential PL implementation of the Lyra2MOD algorithm
would be based on the pipelined architecture of the simplified
Lyra2 algorithm as described in Section IV-C, with appropriate
changes to support the modified wandering phase explained
in Section III-E. Fig. 5 shows the hardware implementation
of the row selection during the wandering phase for both the
simplified Lyra2 (Lyra2REv2) and Lyra2MOD (Lyra2REv3)
algorithms. Specifically, Fig. 5(a) shows that in the simplified
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Fig. 6. Architecture of the MPSoC implementation of the Lyra2REv2 algorithm. The computation-intensive Lyra2REv2 chained hashing algorithm is
implemented on the PL of the device, while the verification software runs on the PS of the device.
Lyra2 algorithm, the row is selected simply based on the 2
least-significant bits of the state (cf. line 23 of Algorithm 2).
On the other hand, the row selection in Lyra2MOD is much
more involved (cf. lines 24–26 of Algorithm 2). Thus, as
shown in Fig. 5(b), Lyra2MOD requires the addition of multi-
plexers and memory to store the new instance variable. The
instance-variable memory is initialized to all zeros during the
bootstrap phase. It should be noted that the changes introduced
by Lyra2MOD have negligible impact in terms of resources.
Furthermore, the critical path is unaffected as the new row-
selection logic in Lyra2MOD translates to significantly fewer
logic levels than that of the 64-bit adders on the datapath. We
also note that, in the 8-stage pipelined architecture, instance
and row1 would need to be stored for every hash in the
pipeline such they are small 8 × 4 bits and 8 × 2 bits RAMs,
respectively.
V. MPSOC IMPLEMENTATION OF A LYRA2REV2 MINER
In this section, we present an MPSoC-based architecture for
the Lyra2REv2 chained hashing algorithm, and the changes
that would be required to support the Lyra2REv3 chain.
Specifically, we implement the computation-intensive part of
the Lyra2REv2 (or Lyra2REv3) chained hashing algorithm on
the PL and use the processing system (PS) capabilities of
the MPSoC to run supporting software used to enable fast
verification of the hashing chain.
In the following, we first briefly describe the communication
mechanism between the PS and the PL sides of the MPSoC.
Then, we discuss the verification software on the PS. Lastly,
we discuss our hardware implementation of the mining al-
gorithm on the PL side of the device including the hashing
algorithms, other than simplified Lyra2 and Lyra2MOD that
we have already described above.
A. Communications Between the Processing System and the
Programmable Logic
Given the limited distinct data types (i.e., block headers
and hashes) that transit between the PL and the PS, we use a
FIFO interface. This allows the verification software to easily
write 640-bit block headers to the hardware miner, and to read
back 256-bit hashes. The parameterized macros that Xilinx
provides include a FIFO device. Two instances of this device
are used: one to write block headers to the miner, and one
to read hashes back from the miner. The FIFO devices are
wrapped in an adapter allowing access to the FIFOs through
a memory-mapped AXI4-Lite bus, as shown in Fig. 6, with a
32-bit width clocked at 250MHz.
B. Verification Software on the Processing System
The verification software consists of a Linux driver and
a userspace application running inside a custom embedded
GNU/Linux distribution. The driver exposes memory-mapped
FIFO devices as a character device, while doing basic sanity
checking to ensure that only whole block headers are written
and whole hashes are read. Userspace applications can then
use the character device to write block headers to the mining
algorithm on the PL side, and read back hashes.
The userspace application is based on the existing cpuminer-
multi [27] open-source mining software, which we enhanced
by adding a new type of algorithm, namely lyra2rev-hw. This
new algorithm pipes the nonce search space, 128 block headers
at a time, to the mining hardware using the character device
mentioned above. The hashes read from the mining hardware
are then verified to meet the imposed threshold. As mentioned
in Section II-A, for a PoW to be accepted by the network, the
miner has to find a nonce that results in a hash with a value
strictly smaller than the target threshold.
To ensure reliable and reproducible software builds, the
Linux-based firmware and boot image are created using a
customized Yocto [28] board support package (BSP). This BSP
includes a custom layer on top of Xilinx’s base Yocto BSP and
a set of supporting scripts to build and flash a boot image onto
an SD card. The custom layer contains the patches to the Linux
kernel and the patches to cpuminer-multi described above.
C. Mining Algorithm in Programmable Logic
As shown in Fig. 6, each hash function has its dedicated
scheduler, and is bounded by FIFOs. The number of instances
of each hash function varies, as it is chosen depending on
their respective maximum clock frequency and throughput in
hashes per second with the goal to balance the processing
pipeline. More details are provided in Section VI, but the
number of instances per hashing algorithm is selected in
8order to maximize the overall mining algorithm throughput.
In this section, we provide implementation details about all
components in the PL part of the Lyra2REv2 miner.
Reference implementations for the SHA-3 candidates that
are optimized for various performance metrics are publicly
available. In particular, a research team at the George Ma-
son University (GMU) described a methodology to compare
the hardware performance of fourteen round-two candidates,
including all of those utilized in Lyra2REv2 [15], and they
also provide the source code for their implementations [29].
We used the GMU throughput-per-area-optimized designs as
starting points for most of our own implementations of these
hashing cores.
The Lyra2REv2 chain passes only 256-bit inputs between
the algorithms in the chain, while all of the SHA-3 candidates
were required to support arbitrary input lengths. Generally,
this results in some functionality that does not appear and
allows for heavy optimizations. Also, the implementations
from GMU include interfaces to communicate with software,
accounting for such things as endianness and serialization at
the output, which are not required for our custom mining
chain. As such, we re-used the main computational block of
the GMU implementations and customized the control path.
We were thus able to greatly simplify the control flow for
these algorithms and could often also introduce optimizations
for the computational datapath. More details are provided
for individual hashing cores in the following. Moreover, the
performance of each hashing core, measured in CCs per hash,
is summarized in Table II.
1) FIFOs: The hashing cores have different nominal fre-
quencies and throughputs. Firstly, FIFOs are used to normalize
data transfers between hashing cores with different throughput,
by properly asserting the forward- and back-pressure signals.
Secondly, since the hashing cores also have various operating
frequencies, asynchronous FIFOs are used to safely transfer
data from one clock domain to another. The forward and
back-pressure signals are individually set to match the internal
pipelined architecture of each hashing core. Lastly, the input
and output FIFOs of the full-chain convert the AXI4-Lite
memory-mapped protocol to a native FIFO protocol.
2) Schedulers: While the FIFOs are necessary to interface
hashing algorithms operating at different frequencies, data
schedulers—one per hashing step in the chain—are needed
to balance throughput between cores with varying execution
times. For example, an upstream hashing core producing an
output hash every 192 CCs will inherently starve a down-
stream core that can accept new data only every 68 CCs. To
address this limitation, in this example we would replicate the
upstream core 3 times and schedule the read/write operation
of each core to produce a hash every 64 cycles.
The scheduler consists of a state machine that monitors
the upstream and downstream FIFO back-pressure signals and
that tracks each hashing core computation. Schedulers have
knowledge of the execution time and pipeline depth of the
hashing cores they are associated to. Given this information,
the scheduler will assert the ready signal of the next available
core, in a round-robin fashion, when the upstream FIFO has
enough data to sustain the hashing core internal pipeline
and the downstream FIFO has enough space to receive new
data. Subsequently, when a core finishes its computations, the
resulting hash is written to the downstream FIFO.
3) BLAKE: Like the round function in the sponge of Lyra2
which is based on BLAKE2b, the round function of BLAKE
is given by an arrangement of G-functions. The G-functions
themselves are not the same as the ones of Algorithm 1, with
different constants for the rotations and with the insertion of
additional adders. We adapted our BLAKE2b round imple-
mentation for Lyra2 to implement the BLAKE algorithm.
Consider Fig. 4, which shows the hardware architecture of
BLAKE’s G-function that updates 4 out of 16 state words,
with all signals being m bits wide. In the Lyra2REv2 and
Lyra2REv3 algorithms, the BLAKE hash function is for m =
32 bits, and uses the constants R1 = 16, R2 = 12, R3 = 8,
and R4 = 7. The inputs CM2i and CM2i+1 take the value
of a round-dependent permutation of a message block Mn
and constant Co. Notably, these inputs are excluded when the
G-function is implemented together with the sponge, because
an interface to inject message blocks into the state is already
present in the functions H.absorb and H.duplex.
BLAKE hashes a 512-bit message in 14 rounds. Contrary
to the other cores in the Lyra2REv2 chain that pass 256-bit
values, the BLAKE core, at the head of the chain, takes 640-
bit block headers as input. The block header is therefore split
into two message blocks, and our BLAKE implementation can
then output one hash every 28 CCs.
4) Keccak: Keccak, which introduced the concept of a
sponge, is very efficiently implementable in hardware, which
is one of the main reasons it won the SHA-3 competition.
While Lyra2 uses a sponge with the BLAKE2b round function,
Keccak defines its own family of round functions called
Keccak-f[w], with w being one of seven values for the sponge
permutation width. Lyra2REv2 uses an instance of Keccak-
f[1600], with b+c = 1088+512, the permutation applied in 24
rounds and l = 256 bits of output hash length. We use our own
sponge implementation with its corresponding control logic,
along with the Keccak-f round function from GMU. Executing
one round per clock cycle, our Keccak implementation can
then output one hash every 24 CCs.
5) CubeHash: Each CubeHash round is simple, but it is
applied many times. Cubehash in Lyra2REv2 does 16 initial-
ization rounds and a total of 176 finalization rounds. Each
round takes a single CC so that a total of 192 CCs are required
to compute one hash. The difference between initialization
and finalization rounds amounts to flipping a single bit of the
state and is trivial to implement in hardware. We re-use the
CubeHash round function from GMU, and implement round-
serial control logic to output one hash every 192 CCs.
6) Skein: Skein is based on the Threefish tweakable block
cipher [9], and uses the unique block iteration (UBI) chaining
mode for hashing, as illustrated in Fig. 7. For the Lyra2REv2
algorithm, all inputs of the first UBI block are constant, hence
it can be pre-computed as an initialization value. In normal
operation of Skein, for an arbitrary length input message, there
is an iterative implementation of the UBI block, where the last
round is slightly different as it inputs the constant zero instead
of a message. However, for Skein as used in Lyra2REv2, there
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THROUGHPUT METRICS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL HASHING CORES FOR THE XILINX ZYNQ ULTRASCALE+ MPSOC 9EG.
Metrics BLAKE Keccak CubeHash Lyra2 Skein BMW
Frequency (MHz) 55.2 200 200 200 76.2 13.3
Exec. time (CCs/Hash) 28 24 192 68 19 1
T/P (MHash/s) 1.97 8.33 1.04 2.94 4.01 13.33
Combined
# Cores/Step 6 2 12 4 3 1
T/P (MHash/s) 11.82 16.67 12.50 11.76 12.03 13.33
0 UBI UBI UBI
Config
Type: Cfg
Message
Type: Msg
0
Type: Out
Fig. 7. Hardware architecture of Skein as a hash function, as depicted in [9].
is an equal number of hashing rounds (taking message inputs)
and finalization rounds (taking zero-inputs). It is useful to
unroll and pipeline the remaining two UBI blocks. With one
of its input as a constant, a significant portion of the logic in
the UBI block that corresponds to the finalization round can
be removed. The UBI blocks in our design are derived from
the implementation of GMU. Our Skein implementation can
output one hash every 19 CCs.
7) Blue Midnight Wish: Our implementation of BMW is
derived from that of GMU, where the control logic has
been completely replaced. BMW in Lyra2REv2 takes a 256-
bit input and only has a single hash round followed by a
finalization round for this input length. The finalization round
can be implemented more efficiently than the more general
hashing round, and since there is an equal number of each,
similarly to Skein, we opt for an unrolled implementation of
BMW. The unrolled implementation contains separate hash
and finalization cores, with a pipeline register in-between
them. This architecture achieves equal throughput to two
parallel round-serial BMW cores, but requires significantly
fewer resources due to the optimized finalization core. Our
BMW implementation outputs one hash at every CC.
D. MPSoC Implementation of Lyra2REv3
A potential MPSoC implementation of the Lyra2REv3
hashing chain would be very similar to that of Lyra2REv2
described previously. The required modifications consist of
the removal of the Keccak-256 and Skein-256 blocks, the
replacement of the simplified Lyra2 block with the new
Lyra2MOD block described in Section IV-D, and the re-
arrangement of the hashing chain as shown in Fig. 2. On the
PS side, the verification software would need to be modified
to use Lyra2REv3, which is also supported by cpuminer-multi.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide implementation results for a full
Lyra2REv2 miner, notably using our simplified Lyra2 core.1
To the best of our knowledge, there are no other FPGA-based
implementations of simplified Lyra2 cores or for Lyra2REv2
miners in the open literature. For this reason, we can un-
fortunately not provide detailed comparative FPGA/MPSoC
implementation results.
A. Lyra2REv2 Miner
The Lyra2REv2 miner was implemented on a Xilinx
ZCU102 Evaluation Kit, which is based on the Xilinx Zynq
UltraScale+ 9EG (ZU9EG) MPSoC. The PL of the ZU9EG
MPSoC contains a total of 34 260 configurable logic blocks
(CLBs) with 274 080 look-up tables (LUTs), 548 160 registers,
and 32.1 Mbits of BRAM. The PS of the ZU9EG MPSoC
contains four ARM Cortex-A53 cores clocked at 1.2 GHz. The
functionality of the Lyra2REv2 chain was verified against test
vectors generated using cpuminer-multi.
The power-consumption estimation was obtained using Xil-
inx’s Vivado Power Estimator tool, where the timing con-
straints are those required for the operating frequencies of
Table III, the switching activity is obtained by way of sim-
ulation [30] with the miner processing input vectors generated
using cpuminer-multi [27], and the post-fitted design provided
to the tool meets all timing constraints.
In Table II, we show the throughput metrics for the individ-
ual hashing cores. Due to the different hashing core architec-
tures, we use a total of 5 clock domains, namely, 55.2 MHz for
the BLAKE cores, 76.2 MHz for Skein, 13.3 MHz for BMW,
and 200 MHz for all the remainder of the sequential logic, with
the exception of the RAM blocks that also require a 400 MHz
clock for multipumping in addition to the core clock. Clock-
domain crossings are done over the asynchronous FIFOs. From
Table II, we can observe that both the execution time and
the resulting individual throughput vary significantly among
the hashing cores, thus making it challenging to perfectly
balance the Lyra2REv2 chain. In the bottom half of Table II,
we provide the number of cores per hashing step that we
use in the Lyra2REv2 chain, which result in a relatively bal-
anced pipeline that is limited by the 11.76 MHash/s combined
throughput of the Lyra2 cores. It should be noted that our
implementation has a total of 24 instances of the CubeHash
core as there are two CubeHash steps in the chain (cf. Fig. 6).
1We note that our VHDL code and relevant scripts for the simplified Lyra2
core are publicly available at https://github.com/Michielvb/lyra2-hw.
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TABLE III
POST-FITTING AREA RESULTS OF OUR LYRA2REV2 CHAIN FOR THE XILINX ZYNQ ULTRASCALE+ MPSOC 9EG. THE AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL RESULTS
FOR EACH HASHING CORE ARE PROVIDED AND THE TOTAL FOR ALL COMBINED INSTANCES OF A CORE IS GIVEN IN PARENTHESES.
Resources BLAKE Keccak CubeHash Lyra2 Skein BMW Total
Area (CLBs) 978 ( 5 866) 453 ( 905) 241 ( 5 788) 1 342 ( 5 369) 938 ( 2 815) 1 305 (1 305) 23 054 (67%)
LUTs 5 042 (30 252) 2 677 (5 354) 1 553 (37 265) 6 001 (24 004) 6 425 (19 274) 7 903 (7 903) 147 641 (54%)
Registers 1 975 (11 848) 1 607 (3 214) 1 039 (24 936) 8 288 (33 152) 2 894 ( 8 682) 770 ( 770) 87 524 (16%)
RAM (kbits) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 1 548 ( 6 192) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 7 524 (23%)
TABLE IV
COMPARISON WITH A GPU IMPLEMENTATION AND A COMMERCIALLY
AVAILABLE FPGA MINER.
Implementation NVIDIA Hash Altcoin Xilinx ZynqTitan Xp BlackMiner F1+ Ultrascale+ 9EG
T/P (MHash/s) 63.09 324 11.76
Power (W) 215 543 9.46
En.-Eff. (µJ/Hash) 3.41 1.68 0.80
In Table III, we show the post-fitting area results of our
Lyra2REv2 chain. Specifically, we show the average individual
area results for each hashing core and the total amount for
all combined instances of a core in parenthesis. The rightmost
column is the total for the complete design, which includes the
FIFOs and the individual hashing core schedulers. We observe
that the 6 BLAKE instances require the most PL CLB re-
sources, followed closely by the the 24 CubeHash instances
and the 4 Lyra2 instances. Interestingly, CubeHash requires
the most LUTs, even though it does not require the most
CLBs. Keccak and BMW, on the other hand, are much more
hardware-efficient.
In Table IV, we show the post-fitting power consumption
results of our Lyra2REv2 chain. The PL part of our Lyra2REv2
chain consumes 9.46 W, which leads to an energy-efficiency
of 0.80µJ/Hash at a throughput of 11.76 MHash/s.
B. Comparison with a GPU and a Commercial FPGA Miner
Table IV also shows a performance comparison of our work
against a Lyra2REv2 miner running on a (non-overlocked)
NVIDIA Titan Xp GPU and on the Hash Altcoin Black-
Miner F1+ commercial (multi-)FPGA miner [31]. The power
consumption of the BlackMiner F1+ has been measured and
found to be 543 W when mining a Lyra2REv2-based cryp-
tocurrency [32]. For the GPU, we use version 390.48 of the
NVIDIA drivers for Linux and version 2.3.1 of the ccminer
software [33] compiled from scratch with version 9.1.85 of the
CUDA compilation tools. The ccminer intensity option
was set to 22 (out of 25), which is the largest supported value
before the GPU memory runs out. All remaining parameters
of the NVIDIA drivers and of the ccminer tool have their
default values. We set ccminer up to mine MonaCoin using
Lyra2REv2 on the zergpool.com mining pool.2 The power
and hash rates reported in Table IV are average values that are
provided directly by the ccminer software.
2We note that all mining rewards obtained during our tests were di-
rectly sent as Vertcoin to the Tip Jar wallet of the Vertcoin Developers
(VnfNKCy5Aq7vZq5W9UKgMwfDLT7NrPRWZK), who are also the devel-
opers of Lyra2REv2 and Lyra2REv3.
We observe that our FPGA-based Lyra2REv2 miner is
estimated to be 4.24 times more energy efficient than the GPU-
based miner. Moreover, our FPGA-based Lyra2REv2 miner is
also estimated to be 2.09 times more energy efficient than
the BlackMiner F1+. We note, however, that due to a lack
of details on the implementation of the BlackMiner F1+, it
is difficult to assess whether the improved energy efficiency
is due to a better implementation of the various hashing
cores or if it is simply due to a difference in the employed
FPGAs. Moreover, we also note that the BlackMiner F1+
is a standalone device, while the power we report for the
GPU and our FPGA-based Lyra2REv2 miner is only for the
computation-intensive hashing chain which, however, typically
requires the vast majority of the power of a miner.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the first FPGA-based implemen-
tation of the Lyra2REv2 chained hashing algorithm, which
is an ASIC-resistant hashing algorithm employed by several
cryptocurrencies. To this end, we also presented the first
implementation of the simplified Lyra2 hashing algorithm used
by Lyra2REv2 in the open literature. The key to achieve a good
throughput and energy efficiency for Lyra2 is to efficiently
map the memory matrix to programmable logic (PL) RAM
blocks and to pipeline the BLAKE2b round function. Our
Lyra2REv2 FPGA-based architecture has an estimated energy
efficiency of 0.80µJ/Hash at a throughput of 11.76 MHash/s,
which is 4.24 and 2.09 times better than an NVIDIA Titan
Xp GPU and a commercial FPGA-based miner, respectively.
At the same time, our FPGA-based architecture is easily
reconfigurable so that it can be adapted to future versions
of Lyra2RE which may be introduced to deter ASIC-based
miners.
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